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Abstract Are international courts power-seeking by nature, expanding the reach
and scope of international rules and the courts’ authority where permissive condi-
tions allow? Or, does expansionist lawmaking require special nurturing? We investi-
gate the relative influences of nature versus nurture by comparing expansionist
lawmaking in the European Court of Justice ~ECJ! and the Andean Tribunal of Jus-
tice ~ATJ!, the ECJ’s jurisdictional cousin and the third most active international court+
We argue that international judges are more likely to become expansionist law-
makers where they are supported by substate interlocutors and compliance constitu-
encies, including government officials, advocacy networks, national judges, and admin-
istrative agencies+ This comparison of two structurally identical international courts
calls into question prevailing explanations of ECJ lawmaking, and it suggests that
prevailing scholarship puts too much emphasis on the self-interested power-seeking
of judges, the importance of institutional design features, and the preferences of gov-
ernments to explain lawmaking by international courts+
One often hears concerns that international judges may run amok, actively expand-
ing international law in ways not explicitly based on state consent+ There is a lot
more rhetoric than reality to these concerns+ In practice, all judges make law+ Indeed,
a key reason states delegate authority to international adjudicators is because gov-
ernments know that agreements are incomplete and that legal commitments will
need to be interpreted and gaps filled in+1 Yet some international courts and tribu-
nals ~ICs! do extend international legal rules in ways that constrain national sov-
ereignty beyond what states had intended+ For governments and commentators
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concerned with such expansive judicial lawmaking, the European Court of Justice
~ECJ! represents the problem in the extreme+
Decades of ECJ rulings transformed the Treaty of Rome into a de facto consti-
tution for the European Community ~EC!+2 The ECJ achieved this remarkable result
by expanding the reach and scope of EC law and by enabling litigants to use the
European legal system to promote key EC objectives+ For example, the ECJ has
condemned Germany’s exclusion of women from combat-related military roles,
Ireland’s censoring of a student brochure locating abortion clinics in Britain, and
the EU’s implementation of a United Nations ~UN! program freezing the assets of
alleged terrorist supporters+3 Proponents of effective international adjudication see
the ECJ as an exemplar for other ICs+4 Sovereigntists, by contrast, criticize the
ECJ as riding roughshod over national autonomy,5 suggesting a cautionary lesson
in why states should avoid creating independent ICs+
This article reinvestigates the history and early decisions of the ECJ to explore
how context shapes international judicial lawmaking+ We do so by comparing the
ECJ with its largely unknown cousin—the Andean Tribunal of Justice ~ATJ!+ In
1969, five countries in the Andean region of South America imported from Europe
the idea of building a common market through supranational institutions—but with-
out an IC+ Andean governments later concluded that the absence of a court under-
mined the uniform interpretation of and compliance with Andean law+6 In 1984,
they established the ATJ, explicitly modeling its design on the ECJ+
The ATJ is one of ten ECJ copies, and arguably the most successful+7 It is the
third-most active IC, having issued nearly 2,000 decisions through 2009+ The ATJ
has fewer rulings than the European Court of Human Rights and the ECJ, but far
more than the World Trade Organization ~WTO! dispute settlement system, the
International Court of Justice, or Latin America’s other ICs—the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights and the Central American Court of Justice+8 The ATJ has
also, as we demonstrate elsewhere, influenced both Andean Community law and
the behavior of its member states+9
2+ See Hartley 1996; Stein 1981; and Weiler 1991+
3+ Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland v. Grogan, ECJ Case 159090, @1991# ECR
4685+ Tanja Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland ECJ Case C-285098, @2000# ECR I-69+ Kadi and Al
Barakaat International Foundation v. Council, ECJ Joined Cases C-402005P & C-415005P, @2008#
CMLR 41 @2008#+
4+ Helfer and Slaughter 1997+
5+ See Denning 1990; Posner and Yoo 2005; and Rasmussen 1986+
6+ See García Amador 1978; and Vargas-Hidalgo 1979, 224+
7+ Ten ICs copy design features from the ECJ: the Benelux Court,Andean Tribunal of Justice, Euro-
pean Free Trade Area Court,West African Economic and Monetary Union Court, Common Market for
East African States Court, Central African Monetary Community Court, East African Community Court,
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In this article, we focus on the ATJ’s strikingly more modest judicial lawmak-
ing as compared to the ECJ+ The ATJ has incorporated the key ECJ doctrines of
the supremacy and direct effect of community law+ But unlike the ECJ, the ATJ
overwhelmingly respects the discretion that Andean law leaves to state actors+ Even
when provided with opportunities to adopt broad interpretations, the ATJ is gen-
erally reluctant to expand its authority or the reach of Andean rules in ways that
constrain national sovereignty+
The ECJ0ATJ’s comparison reminds one of the “nature” versus “nurture” debate
in child rearing+ Is it the genes or the environment that shapes how an actor devel-
ops? Most international relations and international law scholars favor the nature side
of this debate+ They assume that judges are “hardwired” to increase their power+ It
is only limited opportunities or the fear of being sanctioned that inhibits judges’
natural tendency to expand their authority+ By contrast, nurture-based explanations
assume that ICs typically apply the law in fairly straightforward and circumscribed
ways+ Expansionist lawmaking—which we define as broadening the reach or scope
of international law and of IC authority at the expense of national political
discretion—requires, according to this view, special nurturing and encouragement+
We investigate the relative influences of nature versus nurture by comparing the
first twenty-five years of ATJ and ECJ decision making, periods when the regional
organizations that created both courts had smaller memberships,10 nascent supra-
national institutions, and lower trade volumes+We show that the ATJ has generally
refrained from the sort of expansionist lawmaking that is the hallmark of its Euro-
pean cousin, and we offer a new explanation of the ECJ’s extraordinary lawmaking+
Our analysis has three wider implications+ First, we call into question the notion
that international judges are power-seeking by nature+ This assumption lies at the
heart of international relations theories that focus on how specific design features
of ICs facilitate or hinder expansionist IC lawmaking+ Our analysis of two identi-
cally designed ICs suggests that scholars have placed too much emphasis on for-
mal institutional rules and state control of judges+
Second, we argue that ICs are more likely to be expansionist where substate and
societal interlocutors—government officials, national judiciaries, advocacy net-
works, administrative agencies, or the public more generally—encourage IC law-
making and facilitate compliance with IC rulings+ In emphasizing the preferences
of these actors, we implicitly reject the dominant international relations approach
that views the preferences of states as the primary factor shaping IC decision making+
A third broad policy implication of our analysis is that politically independent
ICs can, contrary to sovereigntists’ fears, be active but not activist, interpreting
10+ The European Community grew from six members in 1958 ~France, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, and Belgium! to nine in 1973 ~when the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Den-
mark joined! to ten members in 1981 ~when Greece joined!+ Spain and Portugal joined the EC in
1985+ For most of the ATJ period we study, the Andean Community had five members+ The original
Andean Pact included Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru+ Chile withdrew in 1976+ Venezu-
ela joined in 1973 and withdrew in 2006+
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and completing international contracts while avoiding expansive judicial lawmak-
ing that compromises state sovereignty+
In the next section, we define expansionist international judicial lawmaking and
situate our analysis in existing scholarship on ICs+ We show that the ECJ and ATJ
are nearly identically designed institutions, creating a natural experiment to test
nature versus nurture theories of judicial lawmaking+ In the second section, we doc-
ument the key trends in ATJ decision making+ We show that Andean judges have
copied several key ECJ doctrines+ But we also show that Andean judges are, unlike
their European counterparts, generally deferential to governments with the excep-
tion of the domain of intellectual property law—a puzzle we explain in the third
section by comparing how different environmental factors have influenced ATJ and
ECJ lawmaking+ In the final section, we analyze the implications of this compari-
son for understanding how environmental and political context shapes IC lawmak-
ing+ Inasmuch as our data on the ATJ is new and largely unknown, the appendix
explains our methodological choices and provides a guide for future research+
Theories of Expansionist Judicial Lawmaking by
International Courts
Judging often involves lawmaking+11 When faced with controversies involving inde-
terminate rules, judges must interpret those rules to resolve the parties’ disputes+
Most IC lawmaking fills gaps in existing legal rules, or, in the terminology of
rational choice, completes incomplete contracts+ Our focus, however, is on expan-
sionist international judicial lawmaking, which we define as occurring when ICs
identify new legal obligations or constraints not found in treaty texts or supported
by the intentions of their drafters, and when these obligations or constraints nar-
row states’ discretion+ Typically, expansionist lawmaking significantly broadens
the substantive reach of international law and asserts the IC’s authority to inter-
pret that law+12 We do not include in this definition a requirement that inter-
national judges rule against governments+ ICs can expand international law without
ruling against governments; conversely, they can rule against governments with-
out expanding international law+
Most international relations theories begin from the premise that judges are
power-seeking by nature, using empowerment to explain why ICs expand judicial
authority at the expense of state discretion+ This assumption also underpins most
claims about how institutional design features contribute to expansionist lawmaking+
There are two variants of this expansionist-by-nature theory+ One set of schol-
ars focus on how IC access rules shape opportunities to litigate, and thereby oppor-
11+ Shapiro 1981, 29+
12+ This definition differs slightly from Steinberg, who focuses on the lawmaking by the Appellate
Body and dispute settlement panels of the World Trade Organization ~WTO!+ Steinberg, 2004, 250–57+
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tunities for expansionist lawmaking+ Posner and Yoo claim that where states must
consent to submit disputes to international adjudication, ICs will strive to make
their rulings politically palatable to governments+ By contrast, courts that do not
require state consent to hear a particular dispute ~ICs with compulsory jurisdic-
tion! and those that allow private parties to initiate litigation are more indepen-
dent and therefore more likely to issue expansionist rulings that displease states+13
Other scholars concur that compulsory jurisdiction and private access lead to more
active and independent courts that are more likely to expand the reach and scope
of international law+14 For example, Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter argue that
“transnational dispute resolution seems to have an inherently more expansionary
character”; noting that “a steady flow of cases + + + allows a court to become an
actor on the legal and political stage” and that “a court gains political capital from
a growing caseload by demonstrably performing a needed function+”15
A second set of scholars focus on the tools states use to thwart expansionist
lawmaking+ Building on the insights of principal-agent theory, these scholars argue
that ICs are less expansionist where states can easily revise international rules,
where judicial terms are short or subject to reappointment, and where design fea-
tures allow states to punish judges for decisions they dislike+16 Ginsburg adds that
judicial lawmaking should increase with the number of parties to an agreement
and the difficulty of amending the treaty or overruling judges, and decrease with
the ease of exit from the regime+17
The ECJ–ATJ comparison presents us with a natural experiment that holds con-
stant these design features to explore how environmental factors and political con-
text shapes judicial behavior+ Andean governments replicated the ECJ’s design,
hoping to copy its success in enhancing respect for common market rules+18 The
ATJ’s architects were well aware of the ECJ’s history of expansionist lawmaking+
Although neither the Cartagena Agreement nor the Treaty Establishing the Andean
Tribunal explicitly stated that Andean law has direct effect in national legal sys-
tems or that it is supreme to national law, negotiators assumed that the Andean
system would replicate these judge-made EC doctrines+19 But the drafters also
sought to hem in expansionist lawmaking by allowing only member states to bring
noncompliance complaints, and by explicitly stating that the ATJ should not delve
into the facts of preliminary rulings+ The ATJ’s faithful respect of these limitations
contributed to the dearth of Andean cases in its early years+ In 1996, member states
13+ Posner and Yoo, 2005, 6–7+
14+ See Hawkins and Jacoby 2008; Helfer and Slaughter 1997; Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter
2000+
15+ Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000, 459, 482+
16+ See Stephan 2002; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001; and Vaubel 2006+
17+ Ginsburg 2005+ Steinberg offers a more nuanced version of this argument, suggesting that the
WTO Appellate Body considers how its rulings will affect the attitudes of WTO member states+ Stein-
berg 2004+
18+ Keener 1987, 49+
19+ See note 35+
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relaxed both of these restrictions, so that after 1996, the ATJ resembles the ECJ’s
structure even more closely+20
Both the ECJ and the ATJ provide the same mechanisms for challenging gov-
ernment behavior that conflicts with community rules+ Both systems contain a non-
compliance procedure that enables private actors and member states to inform the
community secretariats about rule violations+ The secretariats investigate the alleged
violation, and, if necessary, file noncompliance complaints with the ECJ0ATJ+ Both
systems also contain a preliminary ruling mechanism in which private actors invoke
community law in domestic litigation and national judges refer questions of inter-
pretation to the ECJ0ATJ+ Domestic courts then apply the ECJ0ATJ ruling to the
case at hand+ In both systems, sanctions can be imposed if a state fails to comply
with the court’s ruling+21 As of 1996, the Andean system has one feature the ECJ
lacks+ If the Secretariat refuses to raise a noncompliance suit, a private actor can
bring the suit directly to the ATJ+
Although the Andean Pact and the EC initially had different substantive goals,22
the Andean Pact’s Cartagena Agreement contained the same key elements of the
Treaty of Rome that the ECJ used to expand its authority+ Both treaties prohibit
member states from creating new barriers to trade, require national treatment for
products from other member states, and allow supranational bodies to adopt directly
applicable secondary legislation+23
Both regional systems also provide governments with the same formal oppor-
tunities to sanction expansionist lawmaking: judges are appointed to fixed, renew-
able terms;24 member states can redefine each court’s jurisdiction by unanimously
20+ Article 25 of the revised ATJ Treaty allows private actors to request the General Secretariat
~which replaced the Junta! to investigate noncompliance and to raise noncompliance cases directly
with the ATJ+ The revised Article 34 allows the ATJ to consider the facts of preliminary references
“when essential for the requested interpretation+” A new section IV authorizes private actors to bring
to the ATJ cases where the General Secretariat failed to act+ A new Article 31 allows private actors to
complain to national courts if member countries fail to make the changes necessary to comply with
Andean law+ The latter provision, however, required domestic implementation, which apparently never
occurred+ These changes are revealed by comparing the original Treaty Creating the Court of Justice
of the Cartagena Agreement ~18 Int’l Legal Materials 1203 ~1979!! to the treaty as amended by the
Protocol of Cochabamba ~28 May 1996!+ Available at ^http:00www+comunidadandina+org0ingles0
normativa0ande_trie2+htm&+ Accessed 22 June 2010+ For more on the evolution of the Andean legal
system, see Helfer and Alter 2009, 879–83+
21+ The Andean legal system has always allowed for retaliatory sanctions ~Article 25 of the original
ATJ treaty; Articles 27 and 30 of the revised treaty!+ In 1989—after the period of time we study—the
EC added a system of fines for noncompliance with ECJ rulings+ See Tallberg 2003, 73–84+
22+ The Andean Pact was focused on generating import-substitution capabilities by building regional
industrial programs+ With this goal in mind, the Pact’s secondary legislation controversially regulated
foreign investment and the transfer of intellectual property and technical knowledge to Andean countries+
23+ In the Andes, changing secondary legislation requires the support of all member states; in Europe,
unanimity was required during the period we investigate+ As of 1989, some secondary European leg-
islation can be changed by a qualified majority vote+
24+ Andean judges serve six-year terms, as do their European equivalents+ Whereas ECJ judges can
be reappointed numerous times, ATJ judges can only be reappointed once+ Judges on both courts can
only be removed for serious misconduct+ No effort has been made to remove an ATJ or an ECJ judge+
For more, see note 79+
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amending its founding charter;25 and they may in theory withdraw from both the
EC and Andean Community+26 As a practical matter, exit is unlikely in Europe,
whereas states have exited from the Andean regime ~for reasons unrelated to the
ATJ!+27
Notwithstanding these nearly identical design features, the next section will show
that the ATJ, unlike the ECJ, has not become an expansionist lawmaker+
Does Active Mean Activist? ECJ and ATJ Lawmaking
Compared
This section compares ATJ and ECJ lawmaking over different twenty-five-year
periods when each IC was establishing its legal and political authority+ Both courts
were similarly active during these periods, with a steadily increasing diet of pre-
liminary references+ Between 1960 and 1985, the ECJ issued 305 noncompliance
decisions and 1,808 preliminary rulings ~an average of 86+1 cases per year!, whereas
the ATJ, with a geographically and demographically smaller region to oversee,
issued 85 noncompliance decisions and 1,338 preliminary rulings between 1984
and 2007 ~an average of 71+5 per year!+28 Notwithstanding the large number of
cases, European and Andean governments were only weakly committed to eco-
nomic and legal integration during these periods+ Pro-integration litigants urged
the courts to overcome these political impediments with teleological interpreta-
tions that furthered the treaties’ integrationist goals+ The ECJ responded eagerly
to these entreaties by engaging in expansionist lawmaking, whereas the ATJ was
more circumspect+
We give greater attention to the ATJ, an IC whose activities have generated sur-
prisingly little scholarship+ We coded all 1,338 ATJ preliminary rulings available
on the Andean Community Web site from the tribunal’s founding through 2007+
Where the ATJ broke new legal ground, we analyzed its decisions in depth+ We
focused on preliminary rulings because most ECJ lawmaking occurred in such
rulings+ We also expected ATJ lawmaking to occur in preliminary rulings+ The
General Secretariat raises most noncompliance cases, and we expected the Secre-
tariat to be sensitive to state concerns and to allege noncompliance only where
violations were manifest+ However, our review of important preliminary rulings
led us to a number of noncompliance decisions, several of which we analyze below+
25+ For the ECJ, states amend the Consolidated Treaty on a European Union+ For the ATJ, states
amend the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement+ Both treaties have been
amended, but only to expand, not limit, each court’s jurisdiction+ On changes to the ATJ’s jurisdiction,
see note 20+
26+ Hartley 1999, 164– 65+
27+ Chile withdrew from the organization in 1976 after a coup by Augusto Pinochet+ In 2006, Pres-
ident Hugo Chavez withdrew Venezuela from the Andean Community+ In that same year, Chile rejoined
the organization as an associate member+
28+ ECJ data from Stone Sweet 2004, 72–79+ For ATJ litigation patterns, see Helfer and Alter 2009+
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We also conducted more than forty interviews with lawyers, judges, and govern-
ment officials in Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia+
Our account of ECJ lawmaking relies heavily on Weiler’s seminal legal analy-
sis, and on Burley and Mattli’s political analysis, both of which argue that legal
actors are power-seeking by nature+29 Following Weiler, we group our study into
time periods that correspond to varying levels of support for regional integration
to capture dynamics between political and legal integration+
The Foundational Period: The ATJ During the Andean Pact
(1984–95)
ECJ lawmaking was most expansive during what Weiler labels as the court’s “foun-
dational period” from 1962 to the mid-1970s+ There was significant political tur-
moil in Europe during these years+ Consumed by internal problems and divergent
objectives, European governments seemingly turned away from supranationalism
and the goal of building a common market+30 Weiler argues that the ECJ responded
to this political impasse by being remarkably activist, building through law what
supporters of integration could not achieve through politics+ In this period, the
ECJ established the core doctrines of regional integration—the direct effect, suprem-
acy, and pre-emption of community law over national law, and the implied powers
of supranational institutions+31
The ATJ’s genesis shares some elements of the ECJ’s experience, but not oth-
ers+ As in Europe, early on a handful of motivated litigants turned to the court to
promote the objectives inscribed in the Cartagena Agreement+32 The ATJ responded
by mimicking the ECJ+ Even though the ATJ’s first case did not involve an actual
or potential conflict between Andean and national law, the tribunal used its first
preliminary ruling to declare the supremacy and pre-emptive power of Andean
law ~the direct effect of Andean law was assumed!+ It cited the ECJ’s Costa v.
Enel decision establishing the supremacy of European law and its Simmenthal rul-
ing that obligated national courts to enforce the primacy of community law+33 But
whereas the ECJ had framed its analysis in constitutional terms, boldly asserting
29+ See Burley and Mattli 1993; and Weiler 1991, 2426+ Burley and Mattli ~1993, 63! cite Weiler as
evidence for their empowerment thesis, and add that self-interested empowerment explains scholarly
and national judicial support for ECJ expansionist lawmaking ~ibid+, 64– 65!+
30+ Hoffmann 1966, 881–95+
31+ Weiler 1991, 2445–50+
32+ The first ATJ case was raised by Germán Cavelier, who had served as Secretary General of
Colombia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1968 and 1969 when the Andean Pact was negotiated+Accord-
ing to attorneys in Cavelier’s law firm, Cavelier viewed Andean integration and the ATJ as mecha-
nisms to strengthen international law+ Interview by authors with German Marin and Emilio Ferraro,
Cavelier Abogados, 11 September 2007, Bogota, Colombia+
33+ See ATJ ruling 1-IP-87 ~points 2 and 3+5!+ See the research note for an explanation of the ref-
erence system for ATJ rulings+ Costa v. Ente Nazionale per L’Energia Elettrica (ENEL), ECJ Case
6064, @1964# ECR 585, @1964# CMLR 425; Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal
SpA (II), ECJ Case 106077, @1978# ECR 629, @1978# CMLR 263+
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that “the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the
benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights,”34 the ATJ stressed
the functional necessity and implicit state support for supremacy+35
The ATJ’s second preliminary ruling raised the question of what becomes of a
national law that conflicts with Andean rules yet remains on the books+ In the Sim-
menthal case, the ECJ had resolved this conflict with an unyielding rule: “Every
national court must + + + apply Community law in its entirety and + + + must accord-
ingly set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether
prior or subsequent to the Community rule+”36 The ATJ, although citing the Sim-
menthal decision, ultimately interpreted Andean law more modestly as “firstly set-
tl@ing# for @a rule of# preferential application+” National law remains valid and on
the books but is not applied+ If the conflicting Andean law is later modified, how-
ever, the latent national law becomes compatible with community law+37
A comparison of the two courts’ pre-emption doctrines provides another exam-
ple of the ATJ’s greater deference to state autonomy+ Without any textual support
in the Treaty of Rome, the ECJ asserted that in fields such as the common com-
mercial policy, Community powers were exclusive and precluded member states
from legislating regardless of whether their actions conflicted with community law+
In other areas regulated by European law, the ECJ concluded that member states
could not legislate even where there is no EC rule on point+ Not only do these
rulings diminish state discretion, it is the ECJ that determines whether a particular
EC rule or policy space is exclusive and pre-eminent+38
In striking contrast, the pre-emptive force of Andean law is far more modest+ In
an early ruling, the ATJ announced the principle of complemento indispensable:
even in areas where Andean law clearly governs, member states may enact domes-
tic laws necessary to implement a community rule provided that the laws do not
obstruct or nullify that rule+39 Stated differently, whereas the ECJ both implied
powers not explicitly delegated to the EC and asserted pre-emptive authority even
where EC law was silent, the ATJ has not implied powers for the Andean Com-
munity, and it has allowed states to retain the power to legislate with the sole
exception of national laws that directly conflict with extant community rules+
In a 1990 decision, the ATJ further cabined the pre-emption doctrine+ Although
citing ECJ case law to reaffirm that Andean laws can displace national rules, the
34+ This famous quote is from the Van Gend en Loos decision, ECJ Case 26062, @1963# ECR 1, 12+
Commentators have stressed that the ECJ’s constitutional framing was an important political move+
See Maduro 1998, 8; Vauchez 2007; and Weiler 1991, 2413–15+
35+ The court stated that supremacy “is the essential characteristic of Community Law and a basic
requirement for building integration+” The ATJ cited a 1980 declaration in which member states had
agreed that “the legal system of the @Cartagena# Agreement prevails within the framework of its com-
petences over national norms+” ATJ ruling 1-IP-87, point 2+
36+ Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmentha, n+ 33, quoted in CMLR, 283+
37+ ATJ ruling 2-IP-88, point 2+
38+ On the ECJ’s doctrine of implied powers, see Weiler 1991, 2415–17+
39+ ATJ ruling 2-IP-88, point 3+
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ATJ also stressed that integration is a gradual, incremental process that limits the
extent to which Andean rules pre-empt national authority: “Especially, when deal-
ing with complex and vast issues, such as intellectual property, + + + it seems logical
that many of these diverse issues, even if they have to be a matter of common reg-
ulation in the beginning, are still within the competence of the national legislator
for an indefinite time until they are effectively covered by the community norms+”40
Other ATJ rulings during the foundational period exhibited even greater defer-
ence+ Consider, for example, the multiyear Reynolds Aluminum dispute+ The ATJ
first rejected the case in 1987 because private actors at the time lacked standing to
raise noncompliance suits+41 The case reappeared in 1990 as a preliminary ruling
with facts strikingly similar to the ECJ’s landmark Van Gend en Loos decision of
1962+As in Van Gend en Loos, the plaintiff claimed that the common market treaty
created an immediate bar to increasing tariffs on imports from other member states+
However, Andean governments had previously adopted, via secondary legislation,
a Free Trade Program that allowed broad exemptions from regional free trade rules+
The plaintiff nevertheless argued that the Cartagena Agreement should be read as
freezing existing tariffs for products exempted by the Program+ Colombia coun-
tered that the Free Trade Program should be interpreted as effectively amending
the treaty+42 The ATJ sided with the government, ruling that member states had free
reign with respect to products included on the Free Trade Program’s list of excep-
tions+43 The ECJ’s Van Gend en Loos ruling made the Treaty of Rome a constitu-
tional document that created immediately enforceable rights for private actors and
higher-order legal obligations for governments+ By contrast, the ATJ in effect inter-
preted the Cartagena Agreement not as a fixed constitutional charter but only as a
starting point for integration, one that member states could amend fairly easily+44
The ATJ has also given more deference to national judges than its European
counterpart+ In a later iteration of the Reynolds Aluminum case, the tribunal con-
sidered which of three potentially applicable legal regimes governed the dispute+
The ATJ defined the obligations under each regime, one of which gave states com-
plete control over certain products “as long as exception and reserve lists exist+”45
But rather than selecting the relevant rules from among the three options, the ATJ
left that key question for national courts to answer+46
40+ ATJ ruling 2-IP-90, point 1+
41+ ATJ ruling 1-INCULP-1987+ This early ruling used a the term “INCULP ” that was replaced by
AI ~Acciones de Inculpiementos!+
42+ Saldias 2007, 12+
43+ ATJ ruling 1-IP-90, conclusion point 1+
44+ Another example is case ATJ ruling 5-IP-89, in which the ATJ allowed governments to deter-
mine whether to prohibit foreign ownership in certain economic sectors+
45+ ATJ ruling 3-IP-93, point 2+
46+ ATJ ruling 3-IP-93, conclusions point 2: “It is for the @national court# to determine whether the
product in question is part of the Free Trade program of the Cartagena agreement, the Nómina de
Reserva @which forms part of Andean industrial programs# or the list of exceptions of the member
country+”
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In striking contrast, the ECJ has a long tradition of reserving to itself the author-
ity to determine the extent of national exceptions to free trade rules+47 Moreover,
the ECJ directs national judges regarding the application of EC rules+ Judge Feder-
ico Mancini acknowledged that the ECJ formally refrains from “overstepping”
its authority to rule on whether a national law violates European law+ But “hav-
ing clarified the meaning of the relevant Community measure, the court usually
indicated the extent to which a certain type of national legislation can be regarded
as compatible with that measure+ The national judge is thus led hand in hand as
far as the door; crossing the threshold is his job, but now a job no harder than
child’s play+”48 As previously explained, Andean governments had sought to
limit the ATJ from similarly guiding the application of national law by initially
instructing the tribunal not to consider the facts of referred cases, and later pro-
viding that it could only consider the facts “when essential for the requested
interpretation+”49
There is thus some textual support for the ATJ’s reticence+ But the extent of its
deference to national governments and judges is surprising+ There were a number
of ways that the ATJ could have used the aluminum cases to expand the reach and
scope of Andean law, and to create a larger role for itself in overseeing Andean
legal integration+ The ATJ could have found that Andean industrial programs pre-
empted national discretion+ It could have declared the exemption list a part of
Andean law and itself determined which goods were included on the list+ Or it
could have allowed national judges to decide individual cases subject to well-
defined Andean guidelines for determining the validity of government exemp-
tions+ Instead, the ATJ handed to national judges both the task of ascertaining which
regime governed and whether a product was included on the list of exceptions,
effectively removing itself from determining whether member states were comply-
ing with Andean free trade rules+
ATJ Lawmaking During a Period of Relative Political
Harmony: 1996–2004
Would the ATJ become more of an expansionist lawmaker if there were greater
political consensus among Andean member states over building a common mar-
ket? The ATJ faced just such an environment beginning in the mid-1990s+ During
the earlier Andean Pact period, actors both within and across the member states
disagreed vehemently about the import substitution strategy at the center of Andean
integration efforts+ By the 1990s, the import substitution theory had come into
disrepute+Andean governments decisively embraced the neoliberal Washington Con-
47+ See Maduro 1998; and Stone Sweet 2004, 122–28+
48+ Mancini 1989, 606+
49+ See note 20+
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sensus, adopting sweeping legislative and institutional reforms at the national and
regional levels with the renewed goal of building a common market+50
In 1993, the Free Trade Zone became fully effective for Bolivia, Colombia, Ecua-
dor, and Venezuela+ In 1994, Andean countries agreed to a common external tar-
iff+ In 1997, they adopted the Sucre Protocol, which resembled the EC’s Single
European Act in that it committed member states ~including Peru! to finally com-
plete the common market+51 Member states also reformed Andean institutions,
replacing the ineffectual Andean Junta with a General Secretariat, increasing the
size of the Secretariat’s budget, and appointing a cadre of young lawyers eager to
use those enhanced resources to promote regional integration+52
Andean integration still faced challenges, such as Peru’s withdrawal from the
Common External Tariff and its delay until 2003 in ratifying the Sucre Protocol+
But using the Andean legal system to promote compliance with Andean rules was
not among them+ To the contrary, revisions of the tribunal’s jurisdiction in the
1996 Cochabamba Protocol suggested that member states wanted the ATJ to be
more assertive in interpreting and enforcing Andean law+53
We observe a marked change around this time in ATJ rulings concerning Andean
intellectual property law+ New Andean secondary legislation ~Decisions 311, 313,
and 344! expanded the region’s intellectual property rules, which led to an increase
in applications to register trademarks and patents with national intellectual prop-
erty agencies+ Although detailed, the decisions contained ambiguous provisions
and lacunae that the agencies and private litigants sought to clarify in numerous
references to the ATJ+
Andean judges responded to these repeated requests by interpreting regional
intellectual property rules in ways not dictated by the texts of the Decisions+ Some
of the tribunal’s decisions were relatively modest extensions of established legal
principles+ For example, the ATJ created judge-made doctrines concerning trade-
mark coexistence agreements and pharmaceutical trademarks that instructed agency
officials to balance the private rights of intellectual property owners against the
need to prevent consumer confusion and promote public health+54
Other decisions were far bolder and substantially cabined national government
discretion+ The first ATJ noncompliance ruling in 1996, which upheld a General
Secretariat challenge to a bilateral agreement between Ecuador and the United
50+ See Dezalay and Garth 2002; and Williamson 1990+
51+ O’Keefe 1996+ For example, the 1997 Sucre Protocol envisioned the phase out of all exceptions
to the common market+
52+ Interviews by the authors with Monica Rosell, former Legal Secretary of the ATJ and Attorney
in the Legal Advisor’s Office of the Secretariat General, Quito, Ecuador, 17 March 2005, and Chicago,
1 April 2007+ For more, see Helfer and Alter 2009, 881–83+
53+ See discussion of changes adopted in Cochabamba Protocol in note 20+
54+ For example, ATJ ruling 104-IP-2002 ~holding that trademark coexistence agreements do not
create an automatic basis for registration, since it is always necessary to place the public interest of
consumers over the private interests of the contracting parties!; and ATJ ruling 50-IP-2001 ~stressing
that consumer confusion regarding pharmaceutical products could create irreversible damage to human
health!+
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States, provides an apt illustration+ Adopted under pressure from the U+S+ pharma-
ceutical industry, the bilateral treaty protected drugs in the production “pipeline”
before an Andean law recognizing patented medicines took effect+55 Ecuador
defended the agreement by citing a clause authorizing member states, “in their
own domestic legislation or under international treaties, @to# strengthen the intel-
lectual property rights provided for in this Decision+”56 The ATJ rejected Ecuador’s
reliance on this seemingly unambiguous text+ It reasoned that Andean intellectual
property rules were “one of the fundamental pillars for economic harmonization”
and “an essential instrument” to “promote well-balanced, harmonious, and equal
development” in the region+ It then adopted a teleological interpretation of the
word “strengthen” that allowed member states to enhance—but not contradict—
Andean rules and precluded them from invoking bilateral treaties “as a reason to
validate noncompliance with a prior Community obligation+”57
In the same year, the ATJ was equally bold in a case referred by the Colombian
Constitutional Court concerning the relationship between Andean intellectual prop-
erty legislation and the Paris Convention—a multilateral patent and trademark treaty+
In this ruling, the ATJ addressed the contested issue of national sovereignty+Whereas
the ECJ found that EC members had transferred entire domains of sovereign author-
ity to the European level by ratifying the Treaty of Rome, the ATJ reasoned that
member states retained control over the pace and scope of the transfer via Andean
secondary legislation+ The ATJ was unequivocal in stating that sovereignty had in
fact been shifted to the Andean Community+ But it also reasoned that the more
extensive the secondary legislation on point, the more “exclusive authority of the
member countries” had been “sovereignly transferred” to the Andean level+ Turn-
ing to the case before it, the ATJ relied on the existence of extensive and detailed
regional intellectual property legislation to rule that significant national authority
had been delegated to the community in that domain+ The ATJ then asserted its
exclusive authority to interpret Andean intellectual property rules and to define
their relationship to other intellectual property treaties, making it clear that mem-
ber states cannot deviate from “the common interests” of the community except
by acting together through Andean institutions+58
The ATJ extended this approach again in a 2001 decision involving second use
patents, another intellectual property right sought by foreign pharmaceutical com-
panies+59 The plaintiff argued that the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights ~TRIPS! required second-use patents+ Adopting a
position arguably bolder than analogous European rulings, the ATJ concluded that
Andean law is supreme even over multilateral treaties such as those adopted in
the WTO+60
55+ ATJ ruling 1-AI-96+
56+ Article 143 of Andean Decision 344+
57+ ATJ ruling 1-AI-96, sections X, XI, and XII+
58+ ATJ ruling 1-IP-96, section III+
59+ ATJ ruling 1-AI-2001+
60+ Ibid+, section 7+6+ For a review of ECJ rulings regarding WTO law, see Peers 2001+
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In litigation unrelated to intellectual property issues, by contrast, the shift in
ATJ decision making was less pronounced+ The court became more scrupulous
in finding violations of clear Andean rules, in enforcing Andean procedures,
and in reviewing the facts of preliminary references+61 But it did not issue expan-
sionist rulings that limited state discretion or pushed member states toward deeper
levels of legal integration+
The Colombian alcohol monopoly cases illustrate the ATJ’s approach during
this period+ In May 1991, Ecuador complained to the Andean Junta, arguing that
municipal rules in Colombia impeded competition and discriminated against
Ecuadorian alcohol products+ The Junta settled the dispute out of court, but it reap-
peared in 1996 in a complaint by Venezuela+ This time the Junta adopted Resolu-
ción 453, a legally binding decision that found fault with Colombian municipalities,
and that required Colombia to fix the problem+62 When Colombia ignored the res-
olution, the General Secretariat ~which by then had replaced the Junta! filed a non-
compliance suit with the ATJ+63
Meanwhile, in 1997, a private citizen had asked the Colombian Constitutional
Court to review the state’s alcohol monopoly+ One of the plaintiff ’s arguments
was that the monopoly was incompatible with the Cartagena Agreement as applied
in Resolución 453+ In its May 1998 judgment, the Colombian court declined to
enforce the resolution+ It reasoned that, unlike human rights treaties that have quasi-
constitutional status in Colombia,64 Andean laws were equivalent to domestic leg-
islation+ Because such laws “and the Constitution do not share the same hierarchy,
nor are @they# an intermediate legal source between the Constitution and ordinary
domestic laws, + + + contradictions between a domestic law and Andean community
law will not have as a consequence the non-execution of the @domestic# law+” The
court also noted that Andean Community law has “primacy” over conflicting
national law—a concept that the Constitutional Court interpreted to mean that
Andean law “displaces but does not abrogate or render non-executable” conflict-
ing national legislation+65
The ATJ issued its noncompliance judgment six months later+ The situation was
remarkably similar to the landmark Costa v. Enel decision, in which the ECJ
61+ In ATJ ruling 19-IP-98, for example, the ATJ delved into the facts of the case, going beyond the
information provided by the parties and leaving no doubt that Venezuela had violated Andean law+
Similarly, in ATJ ruling 103-IP-2000, the ATJ concluded that only the General Secretariat, not national
governments, can determine if imports from other member countries create temporary market disrup-
tions that justify the imposition of safeguards+
62+ This background is referred to in Resolución 453+ General Secretariat resolutions are available
on the same web portal as ATJ decisions+
63+ The case was referred on 20 October 1997+ See ATJ ruling 3-AI-97+
64+ The Constitutional Court ruling notes that international human rights agreements ratified by
Colombia are part of a “bloque de constitucionalidad” that gives them a status superior to national
law+ Article 93 of Colombia’s 1993 Constitution states: “International treaties and agreements ratified
by the Congress that recognize human rights and that prohibit their limitation in states of emergency
have priority domestically+” Colombian Constitutional Court, Sentencia C-256098 of 27 May 1998,
section 3+1+
65+ Ibid+
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asserted the supremacy of EC law+ But there was a key difference+ Costa v. Enel
had been simultaneously referred to the Italian Constitutional Court and the ECJ+
The constitutional court ruled first, finding that European law was inapplicable to
the case at hand and not supreme over national law+66 The ECJ, by contrast, found
that European law is supreme and that national courts were obliged to apply it
instead of conflicting national law, but that the Italian law at issue did not conflict
with EC law+67 The ATJ was less politically fortunate in that the case involved a
Colombian practice that had been challenged by two member states and con-
demned by a General Secretariat Resolution+ Thus, whereas the ECJ found Italian
law compatible with EC law, in the alcohol case, the law and facts were such that
the ATJ could not avoid ruling against Colombia+
In the noncompliance decision, the ATJ went out of its way to agree with the
Colombian Constitutional Court that there was no inherent conflict between
the Colombian alcohol monopoly and Andean law+ But the implementation of the
monopoly was a different matter+ Although the national government had tried to
introduce a common system of alcohol taxation, local policies that created barri-
ers to trade persisted+ Because of these municipal practices, Colombia remained
in violation of Andean law+
The same litigant who had filed the Constitutional Court challenge later asked
another Colombian court—the Consejo de Estado—to review the municipal poli-
cies+ To nullify municipal acts, especially after the Constitutional Court ruling,
would have been a radical step+ National courts in Europe had taken just such a
step when they embraced the supremacy of European law+ But as of 1999, no court
in the Andean Community had shown much willingness to overturn domestic stat-
utes or doctrines to help enforce Andean law+ The Consejo referred the case to the
ATJ as required under Andean law+ The ATJ reiterated that Colombia was obli-
gated to modify practices that conflicted with Andean law+68 Yet the ATJ refused
to extend its earlier reliance on the European supremacy doctrine and, as the ECJ
had done, instruct national judges to do whatever was necessary to give effect to
community law+ Instead, the ATJ simply declared ~again! what Andean law required
without asking national judges to help it to enforce that law+ Although the ATJ did
not explain its reluctance to follow the ECJ, its ruling is difficult to divorce from
the very real concern that national judges might find that they lacked the legal
authority or the political will to heed the ATJ’s request+69
Another case further illustrates the ATJ’s unwillingness to expand its authority
or the reach of Andean law during this period+ In 2003, a former staff attorney of
66+ Indeed, initially the Italian Constitutional Court suggested that Italian statutes take precedence
over the EEC Treaty+ Costa v. Enel. & Soc. Edisonvolta, Italian Constitutional Court Decision 14 of 7
March 1964, @1964# CMLR 425, @1964# I Il Foro It+ 87 I 465+
67+ Costa v. Enel, supra note 33+
68+ ATJ ruling 29-IP-98+
69+ The Consejo de Estado found against the plaintiff in the case, and Colombia has remained in
breach of Andean law+ Decision of Nov+ 11, 1999, regarding Decreto 244 of 1906+ For more on national
court reticence, see Helfer and Alter 2009, 900–11+
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the General Secretariat raised a case involving Andean rules regulating the use of
pesticides in the hopes of eliciting a ruling that would push Colombia to increase
national protections+ The ATJ found that regional rules required states to improve
the quality of health in rural and agricultural industries, and it described the admin-
istrative procedures for registering imported and domestic pesticides set forth in
the relevant Andean Decisions+ But the tribunal refused to go beyond the letter of
those Decisions or to guide national authorities in exercising their discretion so as
to achieve the Andean Community’s broader health goals+70
The ATJ in Times of Crisis: 2005 to the Present
In the mid-2000s, the Andean Community entered a new period of crisis triggered
by political and economic schisms between the member states+ Colombia and Peru
remained true to market liberalization, but Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez advo-
cated a different approach+ The election of Evo Morales and Rafael Correa as the
leaders of Bolivia and Ecuador in 2006 created a three-country block against new
market-oriented initiatives+ Policy disagreements led Venezuela to withdraw from
the Andean Community in 2006, taking with it a significant portion of the organi-
zation’s budget+
This political crisis has sapped community resources, slowing the filing of non-
compliance suits by the General Secretariat and curtailing efforts to build political
support for Andean law within national judiciaries+71 It has not, however, notice-
ably affected ATJ preliminary rulings+ The ATJ continues to issue mostly narrow,
technical rulings concerning Andean intellectual property law+ But the ATJ has
also reaffirmed established precedents, even when doing so required confronting
governments+ In 2005, for example, a private litigant challenged a Colombian tar-
iff that had previously been rejected by the General Secretariat and condemned by
the ATJ in a noncompliance case+ Extending its earlier ruling regarding the Paris
Convention, the tribunal reasoned that regulating the common external tariff was
one of the powers that, like intellectual property, had been transferred to the com-
munity level+ The relevant Andean law permitted countries to derogate from com-
mon rules in cases of emergency+ But only the General Secretariat could determine
whether such derogations satisfied Andean rules+ Since the Secretariat had nulli-
fied the Colombian tariff, the national court was required to do so as well+72 In
2007, the ATJ asserted the supremacy, direct applicability, and pre-emptive power
70+ ATJ ruling 137-IP-2003; and interview by the authors with Marcel Tangerife Torres, former
member of the General Secretariat legal divison, 10 September 2007, Bogota, Colombia+
71+ In 2003, the Andean Secretariat contracted with the Comisión Andina de Juristas to work with
national judiciaries to increase awareness about the Andean legal system+ Initial ambitious plans had
to be significantly scaled back due to a lack of resources+ Phone interview by the authors with Salva-
dor Carrasco,Asesor jurídico Comisión Andina de Juristas, 8 December 2008+ For more on the Comisión,
see ^http:00www+cajpe+org+pe&, accessed 22 June 2010; and note 106+
72+ ATJ ruling 115-IP-2005, considerations point 1+
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of Andean transportation rules, unequivocally stating “there is only one Andean
policy in relation to passengers, equipment and transportation+”73
Comparing Twenty-Five Years of Expansionist Judicial
Lawmaking by the ATJ and ECJ
The above analysis encompasses ATJ lawmaking across the universe of ATJ pre-
liminary rulings and important noncompliance decisions+ To summarize our find-
ings: early ATJ rulings mostly emulated key ECJ doctrines, making Andean law
directly effective and supreme to national law and pre-empting national govern-
ments from enacting conflicting domestic legislation+ The ATJ stressed that gov-
ernments had agreed to these developments, which by all appearances is true+ The
ATJ also enforced clear Andean laws and required national judges to give priority
to those laws, particularly in the area of intellectual property+ In these ways, the
ATJ generally followed in the ECJ’s footsteps as a builder and strong defender of
a supranational legal order+
In numerous other ways, however, the ATJ has exhibited far more deference to
national authority+ It has reiterated that Andean legal commitments are a product
of member state consent and has scrupulously respected the discretion that Andean
secondary law reserves to national governments+ The ATJ has also eschewed oppor-
tunities to expand the reach and scope of Andean law+ While the ATJ formally
treats the Cartagena Agreement as higher-order law, the tribunal readily defers to
collective decisions concerning the scope and pace of Andean integration when
interpreting the treaty+ This approach gives member states broad discretion to revise
Andean rules to reflect the waxing and waning of their collective commitment to
integration+
In contrast to the ATJ, the ECJ is pervasively expansionist+ Stone Sweet has
examined ECJ decision making involving three substantive areas of European law—
the environment, sex discrimination, and free movement of goods+ He concludes
that “through its rulings @the ECJ# has acted—relatively systematically—to reduce
the domain of national autonomy, to expand supranational modes of governance
to the detriment of intergovernmental modes, and to create the conditions for the
gradual Europeanization of national administration and judging+”74
Analyzing ATJ and ECJ lawmaking in discrete historical periods revealed another
important difference between the two ICs+ Weiler observed that in Europe, legal
supranationalism advanced furthest when political steps toward integration were
in retreat+75 The ATJ also developed its key doctrines during its foundational period,
but the tribunal’s lawmaking tends to reflect rather than counterbalance political
support for integration+
73+ ATJ ruling 133-IP-2007, conclusions 1 and 2+
74+ Stone Sweet 2004, 232+
75+ See Weiler 1981 and 1991+
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Explaining the Divergent Supply of Expansionist
Lawmaking
What explains these striking differences in ECJ0ATJ lawmaking? The ECJ and
ATJ possessed the same potent combination of wide access rules, self-interested
litigants, swelling dockets, and repeat player legal entrepreneurs who sought out
cases to promote legal integration+76 In other words, both ICs contained the ingre-
dients needed for judicial empowerment+ But unlike the ECJ, the ATJ often thwarted
litigant efforts to use Andean law to dismantle national policies contrary to their
economic interests+ The ATJ’s refusal to help litigants achieve their goals sets up a
vicious circle that inhibits the filing of additional cases that might have expanded
community law+ It is a striking fact that of the 1,338 ATJ preliminary rulings
between 1984 and 2007, only thirty-five involve subjects other than intellectual
property+77 The abstract and repetitive nature of the ATJ’s legal analysis also con-
tributes to a sense among lawyers that preliminary rulings have little practical
benefit+
Nature-based theories would seek to explain these differences by looking for
judicial design features and political constraints that inhibit judges from issuing
expansionist rulings in response to litigant demands+ But there are no clear differ-
ences between the two regional courts on these scores+
One cannot, for example, explain the ATJ’s behavior by the judicial appoint-
ment choices of governments+ In the Andes, as in Europe, governments nominated
supranational judges whom they expected to have some expertise in the legal issues
the court would hear+ Andean governments submit a ranked list of three nomi-
nees, which, like their European counterparts, typically hail from government, aca-
demia, the foreign service, and the national judiciary+ Other member states choose
from this list+ None of our interviews suggested that governments seek out nomi-
nees with particular judicial philosophies or approaches to their job+78
76+ Repeat players are litigants who raise multiple suits+ Scholars assert that repeat players are advan-
taged in litigation because of their experience, and that repeat players are prevalent in litigation aimed
at influencing policy+ On the role of repeat players in European integration, see Mattli and Slaughter
1998, 186–89; and Rawlings 1993+ We found repeat players in the Andean context in the aluminum,
alcohol, and second-use patent cases discussed above, and in rulings analyzing technical issues of
Andean intellectual property and tax law+
77+ We summarize in more detail the variations in preliminary ruling references in Helfer and Alter,
2009, 886–900+ On how “vicious circles” shut down entrepreneurial litigation strategies, see Alter
2000, 512–15+
78+ Governments often nominate political allies, although these allies are not always selected by
other states+ A former ATJ judge recounted his unusual appointment+ The government put him third on
the list, hoping that one of the two diplomats placed ahead of him would be selected+ It later tried to
scuttle his candidacy by failing to communicate that he had been selected+ ~Interview by the authors
with a former ATJ judge, 22 June 2007, Lima, Peru+! We also find examples of ATJ judges with clear
pro-integration backgrounds+ For example, Gallo Pico Mantilla was a committed integrationist with an
extensive background in Ecuadorian politics and the diplomatic corps+ For more, see Helfer and Alter
2009, 880+
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Once appointed, ATJ judges appear no more vulnerable to retribution than are
ECJ judges+ Both courts issue rulings unanimously+ In neither context have gov-
ernments attempted to remove judges from office, although they have elected new
judges at the end of their terms+ Judges rotate in Europe and in the Andes mostly
for professional reasons and because new governments want to exercise their power
of appointment+79
Nor did we find evidence that the ATJ is institutionally more vulnerable than
the ECJ+ Both European and Andean judges have been criticized for decisions gov-
ernments did not like+ But member states have only rarely overturned unwanted
legal rulings+80 The ATJ decreased the likelihood of such outright reversals by inter-
preting the Cartagena Agreement in light of Andean secondary legislation+ By con-
trast, there have been numerous political challenges to the ECJ and national
judiciaries regarding the supremacy of European law+81 Yet member states have
repeatedly extended both courts’ jurisdiction+82
We next consider whether distinctive features of the Andean context inhibit ATJ
expansionist lawmaking+ One might argue that Latin American judges are more
reluctant to challenge political authority as compared to those in European coun-
tries, where constitutional democracy is more firmly entrenched+ Yet it is both too
sweeping and ahistorical to say that judges in Europe are independent and expan-
sionist, whereas judges in Latin America are politically penetrated and timid+ Few
judges in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s engaged in judicial review, let alone
expansionist lawmaking+83
More recently, across Latin America judges are increasingly confronting politi-
cal power by expanding national and international law, notwithstanding episodes
79+ On ECJ judges, see Kenney 1998+ Kenney finds no pattern of appointment politics or any
indication that political factors influence the selection of ECJ judges ~ibid+, 128–30!+ The average
length of service for ECJ judges is 9+25 years, which is longer than for ATJ judges in part because
there is no limit on the number of times judges can be reappointed ~some ECJ judges were on the
court for twenty years!, and because the Netherlands and Luxembourg generally let judges stay on
the court as long as they choose ~ibid+, 106!+ Our survey of ATJ judges is less systematic, but we also
discern no clear appointment pattern across countries or time+ The longest tenure of an Andean judge
to date is seven years ~and counting!+ Andean judges generally complete their six-year term ~fifteen
completed their full term; five were reappointed!+ Seven judges served fewer than six years, includ-
ing three of the original judges who left before the ATJ issued any rulings+ See Andean Tribunal of
Justice 2004+
80+ The ATJ’s ruling regarding data protection was reversed ~See Helfer, Alter, and Guerzovich
2009, 31–34!+ The Barber Protocol is widely seen as an attempt to curb the effects of an ECJ ruling+
See Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz 1998, 18–20; and Pollack 2003, 359– 65+
81+ See Alter 2001, especially 156–57, 171, 193–202; and Rasmussen 1986, 351– 60+
82+ On ATJ, see note 20+ The ECJ’s jurisdiction was expanded in 1988 ~the creation of the Tribunal
of First Instance!, 1993 ~adding financial sanctions for noncompliance!, and again in 2009 in the Lis-
bon Treaty+
83+ Merryman’s famous explication of the civil law tradition concerned legal practices in both Europe
and Latin America ~Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo 2007, 156–59!+ Constitutional courts brought judi-
cial review to Europe, but in both Europe and Latin America, constitutional courts are new and not
present in all countries+ For more on the development of judicialized politics in Europe, see Stone
Sweet 2000+
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of judicial repression+84 In Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru, for example,
judges have investigated violations of international human rights law and govern-
ment and military corruption at the highest levels+85 Numerous decisions of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Colombian Constitutional Court
demonstrate that neither court avoids expansionist lawmaking or confronting polit-
ical power in high stakes cases+86 This reality only deepens our puzzle+
Some observers may focus on the extent to which member states are stable lib-
eral democracies+87 Andean countries score reasonably well on measurements of
democracy+88 But these countries have also experienced significant economic and
political crises+89 The ATJ’s greater willingness to let member states determine the
scope and pace of integration arguably reflects the region’s unstable political and
economic climate+ We should not, however, forget that the ECJ too undertook
expansionist lawmaking in the face of waning political support for integration,
huge student and labor protests in 1968, and mass labor unrest in the 1970s+
A third potential explanation is the differing levels of intra-community trade in
the two regions+ Intra-European trade was relatively small at the EC’s founding,
constituting less than 3 percent of the member states’ gross domestic product+90
Although perhaps not as economically central to European countries in the 1960s,
trade among EC member states has always constituted a larger proportion of the
total trade as compared to intra-regional trade in the Andes+ In 1958, between 23+7
and 27+5 percent of French, Italian, and German trade went to other European
member states+ By 1972, intra-European trade constituted between 40 and 60 per-
cent of total member states’ trade+91 Trade among Andean countries increased over
the period we study, beginning from a low of 3 percent of total trade during the
Andean Pact, peaking at about 10 percent of total trade in 2002+ For Bolivia and
Ecuador, common market trade is relatively more important ~between 15 and 24
84+ Hugo Chavez has stacked the Venezuelan judiciary with appointees; Ecuadorian President Lucio
Gutiérrez in 2004 sacked his entire Supreme Court, which he claimed was loyal to the opposition;
while the Peruvian government pursued Sendero Luminoso ~Shining Path! terrorist group, judges often
faced death threats; in 1985 the Colombian Palace of Justice was attacked and twelve judges were
murdered+
85+ See Dargent 2009; Helmke 2005; Sieder, Schjolden, and Angell 2005; Sikkink and Lutz 2001;
and Wilson 2009+
86+ See Cavallaro and Brewer 2008; and Uprimny 2003+
87+ Moravcsik 1997+
88+ POLITY scores rate the level of democracy around the world+ Out of a possible 10, Andean
countries often scored 9, and mostly remained between 7 and 9 during the period of time we studied+
Peru plunged to 3 in 1992, and remained at 1 until 2000 when it returned to a 9 rating+ European
countries mostly scored a 10 during the period of time we study, though France had a score of 5 from
1958 to 1968, rising to 8 from 1969–85, after which it has remained at a score of 9+
89+ Boltho 1982+
90+ Stone Sweet 2004, 57+
91+ Figures compiled by the authors from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, accessed through the
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research ~ICPSR!, available at ^http:00www+
icpsr+umich+edu0icpsrweb0ICPSR0studies07628?archiveICPSR&qdirectionoftrade&, accessed 22
June 2010+
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percent!+92 Nevertheless, internal trade has never been as significant in the Andean
region as in Europe+
What conclusions can be drawn from these differences? Stone Sweet and Brun-
nell built on neofunctionalist theory to suggest that increasing trade flows create
a demand by private actors for ECJ litigation, which in turn contributes to judi-
cial lawmaking+93 Pitarakis and Tridimas respond that Stone Sweet and Brun-
nell’s data cannot determine if trade drives litigation, or litigation drives trade+94
In a later analysis, Stone Sweet observes that in Europe, internal trade levels,
secondary legislation, and ECJ preliminary rulings rise in tandem, making it impos-
sible to know if legislation drives litigation and trade, or trade drives legislation
and litigation+95 Scholars are only beginning to untangle these linkages+ Early
results involving a far more precise coding of ECJ preliminary rulings suggest
that ECJ litigation contributes to greater levels of European trade+96 This finding
tracks what scholars have found with respect to the WTO, namely that law influ-
ences trade levels+97
Although we lack precise comparative data, we know that the EC has more
secondary legislation to promote the free movement of goods, services, capital,
and people as compared to the Andean Community+ The existence of secondary
legislation clearly affects litigation+ For example, there is ECJ litigation involv-
ing social security benefits for migrant workers, agricultural policies, and com-
mon customs classifications for which there is no Andean legislative analogue
and thus no Andean litigation+ Andean legislation also sometimes contains loop-
holes that make it hard for litigants to challenge conflicting national policies+98
These differences in secondary legislation influence our dependent variable, since
the ATJ is more willing to assert its authority in domains where there are exten-
sive Andean rules+99 But is trade the driving factor, or does the extent of second-
ary legislation determine the volume of trade and thus the extent of expansive
lawmaking?
It is likely that economic realities influence the extent to which European and
Andean governments invest in building a regional economic community+ Nonethe-
less, we find it implausible that different trade levels explain the divergent law-
92+ See Evolucion del Proceso de Integracion 1969–1999, CAN document SG0di 2190Rev+1 at 28
~26 April 2000! ~on file with authors!; Avery and Cochraine 1973, 183; and Hojman 1981+
93+ Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998+ Stone Sweet and Brunell do not, however, claim that trade lev-
els explain the ECJ’s most audacious expansionist lawmaking of the 1960s and 1970s+
94+ Pitarakis and Tridimas 2003+
95+ Stone Sweet 2004, 57– 63+
96+ Gabel and Carrubba 2009+
97+ Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007+
98+ For example, the Andean telecommunications policy requires governments to provide access to
scarce frequencies+ But the requirement is “without prejudice to such national provisions as each Mem-
ber Country may establish,” allowing governments to privilege national carriers owned by politically
powerful families+ ~Decision 462, article 23! These and other loopholes are discussed in Helfer, Alter,
and Guerzovich 2009, 36+
99+ See the discussion of ATJ ruling 1-IP-96 on page 575+
Judicial Lawmaking in the European Court of Justice 583
making by the two regional courts+ It is far from clear, for example, that European
governments in the 1960s and 1970s saw economic integration as vital to their
economies+ One could easily argue that European governments saw maintaining
national barriers to trade as necessary for the larger project of protecting the embed-
ded liberal compromise of postwar European societies+100
We therefore proceed to interrogate the power-seeking assumption of nature-
based theories+ When we shed this assumption, the ATJ’s prudent decision to let
member states set the pace of integration seems rather unsurprising+ What is sur-
prising is that the ECJ repeatedly chose to be an engine for regional integration
even when European governments, by all appearances, had largely abandoned
the integration project+ Jettisoning the assumption that international judges are
power-seeking by nature thus calls into question existing explanations of ECJ
lawmaking+
Recent historical scholarship has revised previously settled understandings of
early European integration by exploring the role of diplomats, lawyers, and judges
who supported the ECJ’s legal revolution+ This new scholarship explains how
pro-integration activists wrested the subject of European law from traditional inter-
national law scholars, who believed that legal lacunae should be interpreted to
preserve state discretion+101 Activists founded scholarly and practitioner associa-
tions that united pro-integration advocates and worked to educate the larger legal
community about the ECJ’s view of European law+ Pro-integration lawyers then
used their positions as judges and court officials to identify test cases and facil-
itate preliminary references+ Pro-integration activists also regularly met with ECJ
judges, European Commission members, and pro-integration government offi-
cials at events organized by Euro-law associations+ At these meetings, which often
focused on key unresolved doctrinal issues, ECJ judges learned how different
legal interpretations would be received by academics, judges, and officials in key
government ministries, and these actors, in turn, encouraged ECJ judges to be
bold+102
New historical assessments of key decisions in the ECJ’s legal revolution reveal
the decisive influence of supportive advocacy movements+ For example, with
respect to the issue of European law supremacy, the European Commission had
identified a safer interpretive route grounded in the traditional rules of public
international law+ These rules indicated that, because the EC treaty did not directly
grant legal rights to individuals, European law should not be given direct effect+
100+ Milward 1992 makes such an argument with respect to European integration+ Ruggie 1983
argues that the only way to make sense of the postwar trade and monetary system is to understand the
embedded liberal compromise according to which European and American governments agreed to sub-
ordinate the market to the larger purpose of protecting jobs and social welfare so as to preserve social
peace+
101+ On the construction of “supranational” instead of “international law,” see Davies 2008, chap+
2; and Wilson 2008+
102+ Vauchez 2007; Alter 2009, chap+ 4+
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The rules further indicated that the only way to make European law supreme to
national law was to find a basis for supremacy in national constitutions+ This
traditional international law approach was unsatisfactory, however, because the
constitutions of a few member states did not recognize treaties as trumping national
law+
The problem became more acute after the Italian Constitutional Court ruled
that European law was not supreme to subsequent national legislation+ After the
Italian ruling, key actors heatedly debated how the ECJ could find a legal basis
for EC law supremacy+103 Members of the Commission and judges on the court
initially skirted the issue+ The ECJ asserted the direct effect of European law in
its 1962 Van Gend en Loos ruling, but it did not claim that European law was
supreme to conflicting national law+ ECJ Advocat General Maurice Lagrange also
hesitated to claim a basis for supremacy in the Treaty of Rome, suggesting instead
that national constitutional interpretation should evolve to recognize EC law pri-
macy+ A 1964 meeting of the German Academic Society for European Law focused
intensively on this topic+ Representatives of the EC legal secretariat, the ECJ,
and the German Ministry of Justice were in attendance+ The meeting occurred
after the Italian Constitutional Court had rejected the supremacy of European law,
after Advocat General Lagrange had delivered his reasoned opinion in the ECJ’s
famous Costa v. Enel case, but before the ECJ had issued its ruling+ At the meet-
ing, Hans Peter Ipsen, a highly regarded pro-integration legal scholar, made an
impassioned plea that the ECJ go beyond what Lagrange had suggested and assert
that the Treaty of Rome itself implied that European law was supreme to national
law+104 Issued shortly thereafter, the Costa decision closely tracked Ipsen’s
argument+
Once the ECJ ruled, members of pro-integration advocacy movements wrote
scholarly articles championing the ECJ’s far-reaching decision, often shedding their
affiliations with the integration project so that it appeared that the authors were
writing as a random assortment of individual lawyers and scholars+105 These actors
also helped to persuade sympathetic national judges to issue path-breaking rulings
supporting ECJ jurisprudence+
The ATJ, by contrast, has not received the support of legal advocacy networks
or national judiciaries+ In our interviews in the region, we looked for Andean ana-
logues of the academics, attorneys, and interest groups who spearheaded Euro-
pean legal integration+ We identified a few legal entrepreneurs within the Andean
system, but no infrastructure or institutions to connect them to each other or to a
larger pro-integration movement+ Unlike efforts to promote human rights in Latin
America, we found no evidence that the Andean integration project has attracted
103+ Rasmussen 2010, 71–72+
104+ Ipsen 1964+ For more, see Alter 2009, 77–78; and Davies 2008, 61– 69+
105+ See Alter 2009, chap+ 4; Rasmussen 2008, 79; Cohen and Madsen 2007; and Madsen and
Vauchez 2005+
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the support of national judges, nongovernmental organizations ~NGOs!, and gov-
ernment officials+106
The ATJ does, however, enjoy strong support of national intellectual property
agencies+ We explore this puzzle in depth elsewhere+107 These agencies were
restructured in the early 1990s, as part of a larger reform of the administrative
state spurred by the Washington Consensus+108 The new intellectual property agen-
cies were staffed with Western-trained lawyers who received the financial and
material support of the World Intellectual Property Organization and international
and regional financial institutions+ Andean administrators built an informal regional
network to share information and develop criteria to resolve common legal prob-
lems+ We document how and why national intellectual property agencies looked
to the ATJ to interpret ambiguous provisions of Andean law and to provide sup-
port in their conflicts with foreign firms and national governments+ The result is
a symbiotic relationship in which the ATJ develops detailed procedures to help
administrators to resolve disputes between private parties, and the agencies, in
turn, influence Andean legal doctrines to reflect their own policy preferences+109
Unlike the ECJ, however, the ATJ has not seen its support extend beyond the
domain of intellectual property+
Conclusion
International judicial decision making that clarifies ambiguities and fills gaps in
treaties is an inherent part of judging+ But expansionist lawmaking by inter-
national courts and tribunals, in which judges broaden the reach of international
legal rules and their authority at the expense of state discretion, may well be the
exception, not the rule+ Our comparison of the ATJ and ECJ suggests that such
lawmaking requires active nurturing by substate and societal actors, which may—
but need not—include government officials+
A few conclusions follow from this analysis+ First, our comparison of two iden-
tically structured ICs suggests that too much weight has been placed on the design
of ICs as an explanation of judicial behavior+ To be sure, IC design is a relevant
factor+ For example, both the ECJ and the ATJ are highly active ICs because pri-
vate litigants can trigger national court references in litigation involving EC or
106+ For a discussion of these actors, see Alter 2009, 82–88+ We interviewed an organization that
appeared to be a natural interlocutor for the ATJ+ The Comisión Andina de Juristas is a twenty-five-
year-old NGO with a mandate to promote civic participation, democracy, and the rule of law in the
Andean region+ The Comisión has focused on legal problems created by dictatorships and human rights
abuses in the region+ It views the Andean integration project as less important to its work and just one
among many economic arrangements in the region+ Phone interview by the authors with Salvador Her-
encia Carrasco, Asesor jurídico, Comisión Andina de Juristas, 20 May 2008, and 8 December 2008+
107+ Helfer, Alter, and Guerzovich 2009+
108+ See Dezalay and Garth 2002; and Williamson 1990+
109+ Helfer, Alter, and Guerzovich 2009, 12, 21–30+
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Andean Community legislation+ But our study demonstrates that ICs can be active
without being activist+ We also find no evidence that differences in state sanction-
ing mechanisms meaningfully predict when IC expansionist lawmaking is more or
less likely to occur+110
Second, although judicial power seeking and self-interest may be necessary for
expansionist lawmaking, they are not sufficient+ In reopening the question of
whether power-seeking explains the ECJ’s behavior and in identifying how advo-
cacy movements shaped ECJ lawmaking, our study echoes the findings of Sik-
kink, Keck, Simmons, and others who find that advocacy networks help build
support for international human rights law+111 We add to these accounts that actors
within states—national judges and national administrators—also provide ICs with
constituencies that encourage judicial lawmaking and promote compliance with
expansionist rulings+ If this explanation is correct, we should expect ICs to supply
expansionist decisions when they anticipate that domestic advocacy networks and
compliance constituencies will pressure states to change their treaty-incompatible
conduct+ The support of these domestic interlocutors facilitates IC lawmaking, while
the prospect that states may exit from an IC’s jurisdiction provides a counter-
weight+112 The reality that advocacy movements and substate actors can encour-
age expansionist IC lawmaking may be of concern to sovereigntists and defenders
of national executive power+ Yet we have also shown that the ATJ hewed closely
to the mandate given it by the member states, revealing that IC lawmaking does
not necessarily compromise national sovereignty+
Finally, our analysis suggests a starting point for future studies of how environ-
mental and political factors shape IC decision making+ We compared the behavior
of two identically designed ICs in different regions and the behavior of those courts
across time+ One could also compare ICs within the same region, such as lawmak-
ing by the ATJ in comparison to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights+ We
expect IC behavior to be influenced by whether substate actors support the larger
objectives of the international law regime in which these courts are embedded,
and whether the international rules in question are seen as serving larger social
and political purposes in addition to promoting the narrow interests of the lawyers
and litigants+
It may be that more ICs will resemble the ATJ than the ECJ in their penchant
for expansionist lawmaking+ Whether or not we are right in this speculation, the
110+ A possible exception may be the provisional way that European states initially recognized the
jurisdiction of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights ~by declarations for a limited
time!, leading the European Commission to screen out most individual complaints at the admissibility
stage, with the result that cases could not then be appealed to the European Court+ See Madsen 2010;
and Schermers 1999+
111+ For example, see Cavallaro and Brewer 2008; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; and Simmons
2009+
112+ While exit is rare, it is not unheard of ~see Helfer 2005!+ For example, the United States with-
drew from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, and Trinidad and Tobago withdrew from the juris-
diction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ~see Helfer 2002!+
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essential point is that scholars can gain insights by comparing IC behavior across
political contexts, and thus investigating when, why, and to what end ICs become
expansionist lawmakers and active enforcers of international rules+
Appendix: Research Note
Given the paucity of literature on the ATJ, we had to make blind choices when we began
our investigation+We focused on ATJ preliminary rulings because those decisions have been
the most important venue for expansionist ECJ lawmaking, and because preliminary refer-
ences from national courts are the largest source of ATJ cases+ Our coding revealed that 97
percent of ATJ preliminary rulings concern intellectual property issues+ Our coding also
revealed significant cross-national variation in reference rates to the ATJ+ But our inter-
views suggest that cross-national variation primarily reflects differences in demand for intel-
lectual property rights+ In light of the subject matter, concentration of preliminary references,
and the fact that cross-national variation in references is highly affected by variations in
intellectual property applications, we do not believe that regression analysis of reference
patterns would yield useful insights for our dependant variable+ Elsewhere, we discuss the
patterns of references in detail+113
Unlike in Europe, Andean governments rarely offer observations in preliminary refer-
ence cases, and ATJ rulings generally provide scant clues as to how national judges should
apply the law to the facts+ Instead, preliminary rulings mostly contain abstract interpreta-
tions of specific provisions of Andean law+ For all of these reasons, one cannot conduct the
type of analysis undertaken by Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla to probe for state influence
over judicial decision making in preliminary rulings+114 Government and General Secretar-
iat positions are, however, discussed in noncompliance cases+
ATJ decisions are reported and referenced by the Secretariat and ATJ using the case
number+ The letters connote the type of procedure ~for example, IP interpretaciones prej-
udiciales, N nulidad,AIAcciones de Incumpliemiento!+ The last number ~for example,
87! corresponds to the year the case was filed ~for example, 1987!+ Access to ATJ rulings
has evolved over time+ We found the General Secretariat to be a more reliable source, and
we relied on their Web site to access decisions+115 The number of cases available for down-
load, however, is slightly fewer than the number of cases reported in the ATJ’s statistics+
There is also a significant mismatch with the data reported on the Integrated Data Base of
Trade Disputes in Latin America and the Caribbean, which has its own metric of what
qualifies as a dispute+116 At the time of our research, ATJ rulings could be downloaded as
Word documents+Anticipating that this system may change, we note section headings rather
than the page number of the rulings we discuss in detail+ Judges are not entirely consistent
in how they use section headings or in whether they number their conclusions, which is
why sometimes we refer to letters, and other times to numbers+
113+ Helfer and Alter 2009+
114+ Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla 2008+
115+ Available at: ^www+comunidadandina+org0canprocedimientosinternet0procedimientos+aspx&,
accessed 22 June 2010+
116+ Available at ^http:00idatd+eclac+cl0controversias0idex_en+jsp&+
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